BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//pretalx//cfp.dragonsec.si//dctf26//MNT9PP
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:CET
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:20001029T040000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=10
TZNAME:CET
TZOFFSETFROM:+0200
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
END:STANDARD
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:20000326T030000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:CEST
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0200
END:DAYLIGHT
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:pretalx-dctf26-TNAZ7R@cfp.dragonsec.si
DTSTART;TZID=CET:20260321T163000
DTEND;TZID=CET:20260321T172000
DESCRIPTION:In the real world\, computer exploits are often simple: Logic b
 ugs\, forgotten bounds checks\, or less-adept users typing their passwords
  into sketchy websites.\nBut what if we had a world full of flawless code\
 , Rust-only programs\, and completely security-aware end users?\n\nUnfortu
 nately\, we still would not be secure.\nModern systems leak information in
  many ways\, including performance optimizations or unavoidable limitation
 s in hard- or software.\nExecution time\, memory access patterns\, power u
 sage\, and other indirect effects can allow attackers to infer information
  and extract secrets\, even from correctly implemented systems.\n\nIn this
  talk\, we look at examples of different attacks exploiting behavior of th
 e CPU architecture\, microarchitecture\, the Linux kernel code\, and commo
 n applications that are running on your machine _right now_.\nWe will see 
 that many side channels are caused by important performance optimizations\
 , making them fundamentally difficult to eliminate.\n\nThis talk aims to d
 emystify side channels and give an intuition on how they work\, where they
  appear\, and why even "correct" code is not necessarily secure.
DTSTAMP:20260501T112227Z
LOCATION:PA
SUMMARY:When Correct Code leaks Secrets: Side Channels Explained - Hannes W
 eissteiner
URL:https://cfp.dragonsec.si/dctf26/talk/TNAZ7R/
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR